State Control of Local Government Finances-A Comparative Look at the Pennsylvania System by Ronca, James R.
Volume 81 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 81, 
1976-1977 
3-1-1977 
State Control of Local Government Finances-A Comparative Look 
at the Pennsylvania System 
James R. Ronca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
James R. Ronca, State Control of Local Government Finances-A Comparative Look at the Pennsylvania 
System, 81 DICK. L. REV. 575 (1977). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol81/iss3/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
State Control of Local Government
Finances-A Comparative Look at
the Pennsylvania System
I. Introduction
As the problems facing government expand, the law must respond to
meet changing needs. In practice, however, legislation often does not keep
pace with development in the socio-economic environment. During the
nation's recent economic slump, severe financial pressure was placed on
all levels of government. Municipalities and other local units were the
hardest hit. The near-default of the nation's largest city was merely the
most obvious symptom of a disorder affecting many local governments. I
Yet the warning signals have been largely ignored. Most states have failed
to develop legislative programs designed to remedy the problems besetting
local finance.
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The factors that contribute to local fiscal distress occur on two levels.
On the first level, external forces have caused a growing revenue-
expenditure imbalance. Municipalities have been burdened with an ever-
increasing demand for services, 3 and have been unable to bargain effec-
tively with unionized municipal employees. 4 Municipal capital facilities
I. New York has avoided technical default through a complex plan put together by the
state and backed by the federal government. The key part of this plan is a moratorium on
payment of the principal of $1.6 billion in city notes. The distinction between this arrangement
and true default is unclear and is currently being challenged in the courts. Stabler, Creditable
Cities, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
2. A 1973 survey released by the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations [hereinafter ACIR] indicates that of the 48 continental states only six had
operating state controls in four critical areas of municipal financial management. Those states
were Colorado, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey and New Mexico. The survey was
concerned only with operating programs and did not investigate the effectiveness of statutory
control. ACIR, REPORT NO. A-42, CITY FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 163-70 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as ACIR, REPORT No. A-421.
3. Total expenditures by the nation's municipalities have risen from $26 billion in 1952
to $165 billion in 1972. As a percentage of the gross national product, the 1972 total nearly
doubles the 1952 total (14.5% compared with 7.7%). Ecker-Racz, Six Imperatives ofState and
Local Fiscal Strength, PA. DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS REPORTS, Jan. 1973, at 6 [Pa. Dept.
of Community Affairs Reports hereinafter cited as DCA REP.]. During the 1960's the number
of municipal employees rose from 6.4 million to 10.1 million, an increase of 59%. In the same
period the number of federal employees rose by 21%. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2,
at 31-2.
4. Wage expectations are elevated by federal and private employees' salary increases
and by the competition among organizations representing municipal employees to see who
can provide the best deal for their members. Settlements often emphasize large increases in
fringe benefits (e.g., pension benefits) since short run costs are low. In many cases, however,
full costs over the long run are exceedingly high. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 33.
True costs of pension benefits are often hidden by actuarial terminology so that the
public does not realize that pension funds will have large deficits in the future. A DCA study
are outdated, and equipment is often worn out or obsolete.5 Revenue
sources tend to remain static because of statutory limitations6 and the
intense competition for tax resources among local government units.7 The
constant rise in the cost of goods and services means that every dollar added
to the operating budget of a municipality is a commitment in the succeeding
year for a dollar plus the percentage rate of inflation.
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Problems caused, by external forces are aggravated when they reach
the administrative level by the existence of antiquated governmental
structures. Overlapping local units cause both inefficient delivery of
services and a weakened ability to deal with problems effectively. 9 Very
few local governments are large enough to apply modern methods in
solving current and future problems.l" Furthermore, local governments
cannot compete with private industry and higher levels of government in
the recruitment of qualified personnel. 11
Local units respond to the aforementioned fiscal difficulties with
ineffective, short-term solutions: borrowing from the capital budget,'
2
accelerating future accounts receivable,' 3 underfunding pension pro-
grams, 14 using short-term debt to finance operating expenses, 15 and hiding
deficiencies through the use of accounting techniques.' 6 Supervisory
legislation must be established to prevent recourse to these methods.
This comment examines the scope of statutory supervision and
control of municipal finance in Pennsylvania and compares its provisions
shows that Pennsylvania cities have a total pension liability to retired and presently working
employees of $1.2 billion, but assets in pension funds of only $277 million. Wilcox, Growing
Deficits Plague Municipal Pension Funds, DCA REP., Sept. 1975, at i. The true effect of
fringe benefit packages can also be hidden in annual budgets. Between 1940 and 1965 the
number of policemen in New York increased from 16,000 to 24,000 but the number of hours
worked was actually less in 1965 than in 1940. The increase in manpower was completely
eaten up by shorter working hours, more vacations, etc. Savase, Municipal Monopoly,
HARPERS MAGAZINE, Dec. 1971, at 57.
5. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 3.
6. State tax rate restrictions are generally negative and frequently based on the
assumption that local officials are dishonest, incompetent or both. STUDY COMMITTEE ON
POLICY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND
BUDGET ON STRENGTHENING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM, at
22 (1975) (U.S. Government Printing Stock No. 041-001-00104-2).
7. Local government units find it difficult to develop new revenue sources because
taxing power is limited by statute and other revenue resources have already been exhausted
by overlapping tax districts.
8. Ecker-Racz, Six Imperatives of State and Local Fiscal Strength, DCA REP., Jan.
1973, at 8. Because of the backlog of unmet local needs, local spending tends to rise to the
level of available revenues. Id.
9. See Moak, The LegalAbility to Intervene When Necessary, DCA REP.,Jan. 1973, at
11-12.
10. See N.Y. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT 12-13 (1966).
11. Id.
12. See Royster, Life Amid the Ruins, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1975, at 16, col. 3; Beatty,
Some Basic Indicators of Distress, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 33.
13. See Royster, Life Amid the Ruins, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1975, at 16, col. 3.
14. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 54.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Commonly used techniques include: (I) false revenue estimates used to balance the
annual budget; (2) carrying short term operating debt over'into the next fiscal year; and (3)
disguising budget imbalances to prevent taxpayers from noticing budget problems. See,
ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 66-72; Wilcox, The Penn Central Syndrome, orHow
to Hide Deficits, DCA REP., Nov. 1975, at I.,
with the more comprehensive controls developed in several selected states.
Of the six states with comprehensive control programs, New Jersey,
Michigan and Colorado will be used for comparison.17 The various
statutory provisions will be analyzed to determine the most efficient means
of controlling local fiscal affairs without stripping local governments of all
decision-making power. For purposes of comparison, the legislative
response to local fiscal problems in Pennsylvania and various other states
will be examined in three specific areas: (1) state supervision of local
financial management; (2) state control of long- and short-term debt; and
(3) state intervention in local fiscal emergencies. 
18
II. The Legislative Imperative
In most instances, the vehicle for change in the law is either the courts
or the governing body whose interest is directly served by the change.
Because the nature of the powers granted to local governments is limited in
scope, neither vehicle is appropriate to accomplish the changes needed to
cope with fiscal difficulties. Municipal corporations are not sovereign
entities but are considered subdivisions of the state. 19 They possess only
those powers expressly provided by state legislation and those arising from
necessary implication.20 In United Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v.
Philadelphia School District, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated,
"cities have no power to act unless that power is granted to them by the
state legislative body . ... "21 The result of this general rule is that
without legislative authorization municipalities have no right to levy taxes
or borrow money, nor any recourse to the courts to amend unreasonably
17. New Jersey was chosen because of its proximity to Pennsylvania and the strong
economic ties between the two states. Michigan was chosen because it, like Pennsylvania, is a
heavily industrialized state with one dominant urban center and several smaller urbanized
areas. Colorado was chosen because it also has a dominant urban center.
18. Another very important area in the control of local fiscal management is municipal
pension systems. This subject could not be adequately handled in an article of this size.
19. ACIR, REPORT No. A-12, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL AND PERSONNEL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 30-32
(Oct. 1962).
20. This rule of construction, called Dillon's rule, was first formulated in 1872:
It is the general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted
in express words; Second, those necessarily orfairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; Third, those essential to the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient but indispensable.
J.F. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 1872) (emphasis in original). This rule
was adopted in Pennsylvania in Leslie v. Kite, 192 Pa. 288, 43 A. 959 (1899), and was most
recently applied in Pennsylvania in In re Proposed Private Sale by the Tax Claim of Schuylkill
County, 70 Schuyl. 42 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
21. 441 Pa. 274, 278, 272 A.2d868, 870(1971).The issueinthiscasewaswhetheralocal
government unit could tax a commodity that was already subject to a state levy. The
Philadelphia School District had attempted to place a tax on the sale of liquor. The Tavern
Owners' Association claimed that this tax was barred because of the state's preemption of the
area. The court held the tax invalid on two grounds. First, a municipality has no powers other
than those expressly granted. Second, the city had no power to tax personal property that was
already subject to a state tax. In Meixell v. Borough Council of the Borough of Hellertown,
374 Pa. 412, 97 A.2d 822 (1953), the court stated the rule in this way: "[T]he limited powers and
authority with which municipal corporations, as agencies of the state, are invested, must be
exercised strictly within the lines and limitations prescribed by the lawmaking power." Id. at
415, 97 A.2d at 823.
restrictive tax or debt limitations.22 Local governments often find them-
selves powerless to remedy financial problems. The solution, therefore,
lies with the state legislature.23
Any supervisory program designed to correct the problems of munici-
pal financial management envisions some amount of state control over
local affairs. In Pennsylvania, such controls could be constitutionally
challenged. Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides: "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special
commission . . . any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal . . . money . . . whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy
taxes or perform any municipal function whatever. "
This section, adopted in 1874,24 was designed to protect
municipalities from the legislative practice of creating commissions with
the power to spend money and incur debts for which the municipality was
responsible but over which the municipality had no effective means of
control .25 Whether the establishment of an agency by the General Assem-
bly with the power to supervise local financial management would be an
unconstitutional delegation of power depends upon the types of powers
section 31 was intended to limit and the scope of the term "special
commission.'
Cases interpreting this section indicate that only the delegation of
22. These limitations indirectly affect local accounting systems. Municipalities tend to
frame their accounting and reporting standards to meet state requirements. If those require-
ments are outdated, most municipalities will have similarly outdated systems. ACIR, REPORT
No. A-42, supra note 2, at 67.
23. The legislature's position as the one effective vehicle for change in this area is not
the only reason for it to act. The state has a duty to act under the welfare clause provided in
every state constitution. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
The state itself would also benefit from the imposition of controls, since the default or
financial instability of even one local government unit tends to damage the credit ratings of all
other local units in the state. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 70. Michigan has a
comprehensive system of fiscal control and had in 1973 the highest average municipal bond
rating of all industrialized states. Marling, State Supervision of Local Management, DCA
REP., Jan. 1973, at 18-19.
24. PA. CONST. art. III, § 20 (1874). The first sentence of the present article II, section
31, is identical with the 1874 text.
25. Porter v. Board of Plumbing Supervision of the Dep't of Health, 43 Pa. D. & C. 616,
621 (C.P. Phila. 1942). The purpose of the section was aptly described in Tranter v. Allegheny
County Auth., 316 Pa. 65, 78, 173 A. 289, 295 (1934):
By 1873, when the convention was engaged in preparing the constitution,
public opinion had recognized the economic mistake of taking from municipalities
certain powers and conferring them on independent commissions, while, at the
same time, requiring the municipality to pay the bills incurred by the commission
without any restraining voice in the expenditure. The separation of the power to
incur debts from the duty of providing for their payment by taxation, produced the
principal mischief complained of and which it was sought to prevent. Notorious
examples were the Public Buildings Commission, created to build the city hall in
Philadelphia, Act of August 5, 1870, P.L. 1548 .. .; and the Penn Avenue
Commissioners, operating in the City of Pittsburgh, Act of April 2, 1870, P.L.
796. .... The subject was considered by the convention with particular reference
to the experience of these two cities, . . . and that experience illustrates the
character of the legislative interference with local government that was intended to
be prevented.
In 1959, the Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Revision recommended repeal
of article III, section 3 1, because its purposes were outdated and it hindered legislation in light
of the vast increase in urban population since the turn of the century. PA. COMM'N ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 66 (1959).
substantive power is prohibited." The term "substantive power" includes
the power to levy taxes, 27 incur debts28 and spend money.29 This section
would not be an obstacle to the creation of a state supervisory agency30 if
state controls were limited to supervision of purely administrative func-
tions. More extensive controls would be prohibited, however. While the
courts have never adequately defined the term "special commission," the
cases suggest that such a commission would be nonelective 31 and inde-
pendent of local control. 32 These two elements are descriptive of any state
controlled agency, thus the power to interfere directly in local affairs, even
in a fiscal emergency, is not delegable. This is a severe limitation on a
function that necessarily lies with the legislature. Section 31 of article III
should therefore be revised to allow state intervention in a fiscal
emergency 33
III. State Supervision and Technical Assistance in Local Fiscal
Management
Failure to apply the basic principles of sound financial management is
a fundamental cause of local fiscal difficulty.34 A workable statutory
program designed to remedy the problem would impose standards to assure
the use of proper management techniques while preserving local decision-
making power. Legislation designed to meet these criteria would provide
four types of control: a system of uniform accounting standards for all local
government units; a system of controls over local budgeting practices; a
required annual report of local financial condition; and a state agency
empowered to provide technical assistance to those local units that need or
ask for it.
A. Uniform Accounting Standards
The need for improvement in local government accounting practices
has been recognized for more than thirty years. The National Municipal
League proposed model legislation in 1946 designed to impose an accrual
system of accounting on all municipalities for the purpose of insuring
long-term financial stability.3" In most states, the quality of municipal
accounting is still inferior.3 6 Many local government units, especially the
26. See, e.g., Porter v. Board of Plumbing Supervision of the Dep't of Health, 43 Pa. D.
& C. 616 (C.P. Phila. 1942).
27. Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor Dist., 329 Pa. 390, 197 A. 334 (1938); Wilson v.
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937).
28. Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor Dist., 329 Pa. 390, 197 A. 334 (1938).
29. Porter v. Board of Plumbing Supervision of the Dep't of Health, 43 Pa. D. & C. 616
(C.P. Phila. 1942).
30. Id.
31. Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor Dist., 329 Pa. 390, 405, 197 A. 334, 341 (1938).
32. Lighton v. Township of Abington, 336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609 (1939). Accord, Wilson v.
School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937).
33. See note 25 supra.
34. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL ACCRUAL BUDGET LAW ix (1946).
35. Id.
36. Marling, State Supervision ofLocalDebtManagernent, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 17.
very small ones, continue to use a single-entry cash basis method of
accounting. 37 One Pennsylvania community, which experienced a default
on employee wages in 1971, maintained no records whatever.38 Of those
municipalities that have adopted a more modern accrual method, most do
not meet national standards.
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1. Pennsylvania Provisions.-The Pennsylvania Department of
Community Affairs [hereinafter DCA] has the power to "install" in
Commonwealth municipalities a "uniform system of accounts"'' 4 and
provide blank forms for making budgets and annual financial reports.4 ' All
municipalities except the cities of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Scranton
are required to file these forms annually.
42
These provisions are inadequate in two respects. First, the provisions
exclude three of the state's largest cities. 43 Consequently, 1.1 billion
dollars in municipal revenues are not subject to state-imposed accounting
controls.' Second, the provisions are drafted in ineffective terms. When
determining the scope of an administrative agency's power, Pennsylvania
courts have applied the general rule that an administrative agency has only
those powers expressly delegated by the constitution and statutes of the
state and those that may be properly implied from the particular nature of
37. The single entry method provides no counter-check on the accuracy of figures;
consequently errors are difficult or impossible to trace.
38. In September, 1971, the borough of Darby notified DCA that it had run out of funds
and had no credit. Upon investigation, DCA discovered that Darby officials had failed to keep"any kind of adequate bookkeeping system." ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 40.
The lack of records made auditing a near impossibility and the actual cause of this fiscal crisis
is undetermined.
39. There are no "official standards." The standards published by the Municipal
Finance Officers Association are generally accepted by authorities in this field. NA-
TIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, MUNICIPAL FINANCE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, GOVERNMENT AUDITING, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING
(1968).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 334 (Supp. 1976) provides:
The Department of Community Affairs shall have the power, and its duty shall be:
(c) To install or assist in the installation and establishment of uniform systems
of accounts in the various municipalities of the State.
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 339 (Supp. 1976) provides:
The Department of Community Affairs shall have power and its duty shall be:
(a) To prepare, in cooperation with duly authorized committees of local
government officials, and furnish annually at the expense of the Commonwealth, to
the corporate authorities of each county (except counties of the first class), city of
the third class, borough, incorporated town, township, school district of the
second, third, and fourth class blank forms suitable for the making of budgets by
the proper authorities of said local government and for the filing of a copy of the
budget after adoption with said department.
(b) To furnish . ..blank forms for making of annual reports of financial
condition.
42. PA. STAT ANN. tit. 71, §§ 334, 339 (Supp. 1976) do not provide for cities of the first
class (Philadelphia), cities of the second class (Pittsburgh) or cities of second class A
(Scranton). See note 41 supra.
43. See notes 41 and 42 supra.
44. Pennsylvania's population was 11,793,909 in 1970. The combined population of
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Scranton was 2,573,779. PA. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, RESEARCH
AND PLANNING, PENNSYLVANIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 19 (1975). Tax revenues for these
cities in 1972 were: Philadelphia, $951 million; Pittsburgh, $124 million; and Scranton, $13
million. Id. at 234. These figures are a minimum indication of the effect these cities have on
the state's economy since they do not take into account metropolitan areas that surround and
are strongly influenced by the central city.
the duties imposed on them.4" These implied powers are limited to those
that arise from necessity. 6There is no language in the Pennsylvania statute
that would imply a power to set uniform accounting standards. The term
"accounts" is commonly defined as "a list of items of debits and
credits," 4 7 while the term "accounting" generally means a "system of
making up or settling accounts."- 48 Applying the rule of construction
mentioned above, the provisions must be construed as looking toward a
uniform method of describing budget items for the purpose of making the
annual budget and financial statement statistically comparable. This con-
clusion is supported by the fact that there are no sanctions for failure to
install this system. These provisions have resulted in a published manual
defining budget items for use with blank budget and financial statement
forms .
49
2. Comparison with Other States. -States that have established
uniform accounting practices have generally employed one of two princi-
pal types of legislation. In Colorado and Michigan, an advisory commis-
sion was created with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
imposing accounting standards. 5° The standards adopted by both states
substantially comply with national standards published by the Municipal
Finance Officers Association.51 Enforcement provisions differ, however.
In Colorado, the standards are not mandatory and the State Auditor relies
on incentives to bring municipalities into line.52 In Michigan, although
standardized municipal accounting systems are required by the constitu-
tion, 53 the state has taken a cooperative approach, using incentives rather
than sanctions for enforcement. In both states the provisions clearly apply
to all local government units.
54
45. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken of Altoona, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Review, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 90, 309 A.2d 154 (1973); City of Pittsburgh v. Milk
Marketing Bd., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 180, 299 A.2d 197 (1973); Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm. v. Brucker, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 369 (C.P. Dauphin 1970).
In Commonwealth v. Reitz, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 122, 39 A.2d 522 (1944), the court ruled
that when the legislature "fails, however, to prescribe with reasonable clarity, the limits of
power delegated [to an administrative agency] or if those limits are too broad, its attempt to
delegate is a nullity." Id. at 127, 39 A.2d at 524.
46. Commonwealth v. Tarabilda, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 237,294 A.2d 830(1972); Common-
wealth v. Reitz, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 122, 39 A.2d 522 (1944).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (4th ed. 1968).
48. Id. at 36.
49. PA. DEP'TOF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, MANUAL OF ACCOUNTING AND RELATED FINAN-
CIAL PROCEDURES FOR PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES (1968).
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-101 (1973); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 21. Minor deviations
exist to meet the particular needs of each state.
ACIR recommends a cooperative approach in enforcing statewide accounting standards.
ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM 21 (Nov. 1975).
51. See note 39 supra.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-504 (1973).
53. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 21. As of 1973 not all local units in Michigan had complied
with this section. Marling, State Supervision of Local Management, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at
18.
54. The Colorado statute defines "local government" to include the government of any
county, city, town, school district or special district. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-502 (1973).
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 21 provides; "The legislature shall provide by law for the mainte-
nance of uniform accounting systems by units of local government .... "
The New Jersey approach is more strict.5 5 The New Jersey Local
Government Board prescribes a uniform accounting system that all
municipalities are required to use.5 6 If a local unit refuses or fails to
comply, the Director of the Local Government Division of the Community
Affairs Department has the power to install an accounting system at the
local government's expense.
57
3. Comments and Recommendations. -Implementation of uniform
accounting standards is valuable in at least two ways. First, it provides a
sound and rational basis for handling the flow of money. Second, it eases
the flow of communication between state and local government. Both
functions are essential in predicting and preventing a financial emergency.
Pennsylvania should therefore adopt a mandatory system of standardized
accounting principles to be utilized by all local governments in the
Commonwealth. 58 A state agency should be expressly empowered to
promulgate rules and regulations establishing such standards. The state
agency should also be authorized to impose these standards when the local
government refuses to comply and should be able to approve the continued
use of existing systems if they substantially comply with the rules and
regulations.
B. Budget Control
Improper budgeting procedure is a major cause of revenue-
expenditure imbalance in local government. Most municipal budgets are
balanced on paper when adopted at the beginning of the fiscal year. 59 Many
become unbalanced during the year because of over-expenditure of ap-
propriations, over-estimation of anticipated revenue, expenditures for
necessities not included in the budget, 60 and failure to adhere to the budget
during the fiscal year. 61 The problems of drafting an effective budget
control law are increased by the potential for stripping local governments
of decision-making power.
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-27 (1955). New Jersey experienced numerous municipal
defaults in the 1930's. The state responded with strict control over municipal finance. Since
then, New Jersey has been the pacesetter in municipal financial control legislation.
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-27 (1955) provides:
The board shall, after careful study and investigation of accounting requirements,
prescribe uniform accounting systems for municipalities and counties, and may,
from time to time, revise or amend such systems. The board may classify
municipalities and counties in accordance with different types of accounting
requirements and may prescribe a suitable variation of the uniform system to apply
to each class. The use of the system when prescribed, shall be mandatory in
accordance with the regulations of the board. This section shall not be construed to
prevent the director, with the consent of the board, from approving the continued
use of a system used by county or municipality that meets the requirements of and
is in substantial conformity with the uniform system prescribed.
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-30 (1955). An existing system can be continued only if
the Director of the Division of Local Finance certifies that there is substantial compliance
with the applicable rules and regulations. Id.
58. Local officials in Pennsylvania have historically opposed all forms of state interfer-
ence in local affairs. A mandatory program would, therefore, be the only effective system.
59. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL ACCRUAL BUDGET LAW ix (1946).
60. Id.
61. Beatty, Some Basic Indicators of Distress, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 34.
1. Pennsylvania Provisions.-The Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly has done little in the area of budget control. The sole state control
provision empowers DCA to distribute blank budget-making forms to local
government units, for completion and filing with the department.62 This
limited state control results in lower credibility in the financial community
and increase the potential for abuse. Philadelphia recently announced an
eighty million dollar budget deficit despite a provision in the city charter
requiring a balanced budget. The deficit was largely attributable to a
sixty-five million dollar overestimation of anticipated state and federal
aid.63
2. Comparison with Other States.-In states with comprehensive
local budget laws, two types of legislation exist. Colorado takes a liberal
approach, mandating only the minimum requirements of sound budgeting
practice, while maintaining an advisory position in relation to review of
specific municipalities. 64 Colorado law requires the adoption of a balanced
budget annually,65 with public notice prior to adoption.66 The budget is
subject to public objections. 6 7 All appropriation ordinances enacted during
the fiscal year must be included in the budget ordinance, 68 with the
exception of special appropriations for emergencies. 69 A copy of the
budget is filed with the state70 and reviewed. 7 1 The penalty for knowing
and willful violation or intentional failure to perform required duties is
removal from office.
72
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 339(b) (Supp. 1976).
63. Philadelphia's 1975 budget included $65.3 million from dubious revenue sources
including $12 million of federal revenue sharing funds from a tax never approved by
Congress. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1976, at 24, col. 2. This situation has caused a lowering of
Philadelphia's bond rating and has forced city officials to ask the state legislature for an
emergency tax boost. Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 3, col. 3. Information on the budget deficit
was withheld for six months until local elections were completed. Philadelphia Sunday Bull.,
Jan. 18, 1976, at 10, col. 1.
In the long run, unsound budgeting procedure was the primary cause of New York City's
financial collapse. Statement by Treasury Secretary Simon before the Subcommittee on
Economic Stabilization, House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing, Oct. 30,
1975 (Reported in U.S. Dep't of the Treasury News, Nov. 3, 1975, at 6).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1-101 to608 (1973). The Colorado statute does not apply to
home-rule municipalities. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-102 (1963).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-104 (1973).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-108 (1973).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-109 (1973).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-111 (1973). This section effectively prevents municipalities
from straying from budget provisions.
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-114 (1973) provides:
In cases of emergency caused by an act of God or the public enemy or some
contingency which could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time of adoption
of the budget, the governing body of such local government may authorize the
expenditure of funds in excess of the budget by ordinance or resolution duly
adopted by a two-thirds vote of such governing body. Such ordinance or resolution
shall set forth in full the facts concerning such emergency. . . .A certified copy of
such ordinance or resolution shall be filed with the division of local government in
the department of local affairs. Said ordinance or resolution shall be published in
full one time in a newspaper having general circulation within the limits of such
governmental subdivision.
70. COLO. REV. STAT. 29-1-116 (1973).
71. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 164.
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-118 (1973). The statute provides no penalty for negligent
failure to perform duties.
In New Jersey, local budget control goes considerably beyond the
scope of Colorado law. 73 While the New Jersey Local Budget Law contains
general provisions similar to those found in Colorado, 74 New Jersey
emphasizes three types of more substantive controls. First, New Jersey
maintains strict statutory control over methods of estimating anticipated
revenue. 75 These sections are designed to assure that municipalities have
sufficient cash on hand to meet all debt requirements and operating
expenses. 76 As a result, a large majority of the local government units in
New Jersey show a strong cash position and ample fund surplus. 77 Second,
New Jersey law limits the transfer of funds from one appropriation
category to another 78 and mandates that cash deficits be funded in the next
fiscal year. 79 Third, New Jersey requires that each budget be approved by
the Director of the Local Government Division before it is discussed at
public hearing and adopted. 80 The approval power is limited to procedural
compliance. 8' The Director may not substitute his discretion for that of
local officials. 82 In this way, New Jersey attempts to leave substantive
matters to be resolved by local decision-makers while forcing them into
sound budgeting practices through strict procedural control. The statute
expressly grants the director broad investigative powers. 83 Should the
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. H§ 40A:4-1 to 4-87 (1976).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-3, 4-8, 46-51, 46-53 (1976).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-25 to 4-30, 4-40 to 4-41 (1976). In New Jersey, the
amount to be raised by taxes includes a reserve for uncollected taxes. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40A:4-30 (1976) provides:
The amount to be raised by taxes shall be the amount required to be levied by
taxation for the support of the municipal budget. It is the difference between the
total of all general municipal budget appropriations, . . . less the total of antici-
pated revenues. It shall include the amount required to be appropriated for the'reserve for uncollected taxes' . .. .
Other revenue anticipation estimates must be made in relation to the actual receipts during the
previous year. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-25 to 4-29 (1976).
76. Although social statistics show Newark to be one of the most blighted American
cities, the financial condition of the city remains strong. This fact is largely attributable to
New Jersey's stringent controls over municipal finances. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra
note 2, at 45-46.
77. Id.
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-58 (1976).
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-42 (1976).
80. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-78 (1976) provides:
If the director finds that all requirements of law and of the regulations of the
local government board have been met, he shall approve the budget otherwise he
shall refuse to approve it.
The director, in refusing to approve a budget, shall not substitute his discretion
with respect to the amount of an appropriation when such amount is not made
mandatory because of the requirements of law.
81. See note 80 supra.
82. Id.
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-76 (1976) provides:
The director shall examine the budget filed in his office with reference to all
estimates of revenue and to the following appropriations:
a. Payment of interest and debt redemption charges.
b. Deferred charges and statutory expenditures.
c. Cash deficit of preceding year.
d. Reserve for uncollected taxes.
e. Other reserves and nondisbursement items.
The director shall also examine the budget for detail and accuracy of itemiza-
tion and for compliance as to form, arrangement and content with the provisions of
this chapter and the regulations of the local government board.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-77 (1976) provides:
Director disapprove a budget, the local government must amend the budget
according to the Director's instructions.8 4 The local government may
appeal the Director's decision to the New Jersey Superior Court.
85
3. Comments and Recommendations.-While the New Jersey
budget law allows a large degree of state intervention into local matters,
this disadvantage is offset by the impressive financial track record of New
Jersey municipalities since the adoption of this comprehensive local budget
law. 8 6 Moreover, the statute reserves to local officials the power they
desire most: the power to determine how local money will be spent.8 7 The
requirement that all budgets be approved prior to adoption could become
burdensome and expensive. A more efficient system would provide for a
summary review with the requirement of agency approval activated by the
existence of one or more indications of budgeting problems.88 Since this
proposal would not make approval mandatory, strong sanctions should
exist to deter willful or negligent violations of the law.
C. Auditing and Financial Reporting
Most states have statutes requiring the filing of financial reports at the
end of each fiscal year. 89 A problem in many states is the failure to update
these reporting systems. In many instances these systems are designed to
test the honesty of municipal officers rather than reflect the municipalities'
true financial position. 90 It is a universal practice in private corporations to
have annual audits performed by independent certified public accountants.
Unfortunately, many municipalities have failed to adopt this practice.
91
1. Pennsylvania Provisions.-DCA is directed by statute to furnish
municipalities with blank forms for annual reports of financial condition
92
and to publish the substance of such reports in an annual statement. In
practice these provisions have resulted in the distribution of a detailed audit
form to be prepared by the local government's finance officer.93 The
The director shall determine upon the basis of information and data available
whether:
a. All estimates of revenue are reasonable, accurate and correctly stated;
b. items of appropriation are properly set forth;
c. in itemization, form, arrangement and content, the budget will permit the
exercise of the comptroller function within the local unit;
d. the budget complies with the requirements of law and the regulations of the
local government board.
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-81, 4-82, 4-86 (1976).
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:4-82 (1967).
86. See, e.g., note 76 supra.
87. See note 80 supra.
88. See note 180 and accompanying text infra.
89. Only five states have no post-fiscal year reporting requirements: Alabama, Dela-
ware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 164-70.
90. Id. at 67.
91. Id. A simple audit by independent accountants is the minimum that should be
required. Id. at 5. The scope of municipal audits can go far beyond this. See note 101 and
accompanying text infra.
92. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
93. See PA. D.C.A., FORM No. 595 (1974).
officer who prepares the report must swear to its careful preparation and
accuracy.
94
2. Comparison with Other States.-States with comprehensive
audit laws generally follow a similar pattern. Annual audits, compiled by
independent certified public accountants, 95 must be filed within a limited
period after the fiscal period ends. 96 The auditor is required to use
prescribed accounting standards 97 and must submit an opinion on the
financial condition of the municipality. 98 New Jersey goes one step further
by empowering the Director of the Local Government Division to require
that audits be performed by state auditing personnel when the director
determines that the affairs of a particular municipality require special
supervision.
99
3. Comments and Recommendations.-Pennsylvania's provisions
are inadequate in a number of ways. DCA has no power of review. The
agency merely compiles completed audit forms into a public statement,
presumably so that the budget can be challenged by private citizens. Since
there are no uniform accounting standards, the information cannot be
properly correlated. No independent check on the accuracy of figures is
made, nor is a disinterested opinion of the economic position of the unit in
question rendered, because the officer who files the report is the same
officer who compiles the budget and keeps the records. Finally, actions
against the financial officer for negligence in preparing the reports are
prevented by the language of his sworn statement.1t° He is subject to
prosecution only for willful violations.
Normally, an audit is considered to be merely a check on the accuracy
of books and records. Audits can, however, serve other purposes. The
information gained through an audit would aid municipalities in gaging
program effectiveness, increasing operational efficiency and formulating
long-term fiscal plans.') Audit information also helps the state evaluate
deficiencies in local finance laws. Pennsylvania should therefore adopt
laws requiring all government units to have annual audits performed by
independent accountants.
10 2
94. The reporting local officer must certify an oath that the report is based on original
books, papers and records, and that he has carefully examined the report for completeness
and accuracy to the best of his "knowledge, information and belief." Id.
95. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §29-1-603(2) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §40A:5-4(1976).
In New Jersey accountants are required to take a special test, register, and be licensed before
they are permitted to make municipal audits. Id.
96. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-603(1) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §40A:5-4(1976).
New Jersey law also requires municipalities to file an annual financial statement. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40A:5-12 (1976).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-605(a) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-35 (1960).
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-605(b) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:5-5 (1976).
99. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-37 (1955).
100. See note 94 supra.
101. Marling, State Supervision of Local Management, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 18.
102. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 provides:
The financial affairs of any entity, funded or financially aided by the Common-
wealth . . . shall be subject to audits made in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards.
D. Creation of a State Advisory Agency
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has rec-
ommended that each state create an agency to set uniform accounting and
auditing standards, provide technical assistance to local government fi-
nance officers, and detect financial problems in municipalities before they
develop into financial crises.' 0 3 In Pennsylvania, DCA cannot assume
these functions because it is hampered by the ineffectiveness of its statutory
powers. 10 4 New Jersey's supervisory agencies' 0 5 are effective because
their functions are clearly mandated by legislation.' 06 Pennsylvania should
revise its existing statutory provision to grant DCA powers similar to those
recommended by ACIR.
IV. State Assistance in Local Debt Management
A. Long-Term Debt
10 7
States have a large interest in the quality of local government debt
management. A blemish on the credit standing of even a single municipal-
ity tends to affect an investor's judgment of other intrastate bond issues. 
108
Local governmental long-term borrowing is subject, in most states, to an
extensive and complex body of law that details limitations on indebtedness
and the procedural structure of bond issuance. 109 This comment addresses
only those provisions that are designed to protect municipalities from
overborrowing. These "safeguard" provisions generally take three forms:
limitations on the total amount of long-term indebtedness that can be
incurred by a local government, limitations on maturity dates, and report-
ing requirements.
1. Limitations on Amount of Indebtedness. -Historically, munici-
pal debt limitations were created in reaction to numerous defaults by
municipalities on various types of railroad bonds in 1873.110 State legis-
lators, attributing this collapse to financial irresponsibility, hurriedly
passed legislation designed to promote fiscal sensibility in local govern-
ment. Most provisions took the form of a ceiling limit on the amount a
municipality could borrow, computed as a percentage of the local property
Statutes implementing this section apply only to state departments, commissions, authorities
and agencies. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 306, 307, 402, 404, 1501 (Supp. 1976). Since most
municipal entities are financially aided by the state, this section could be used as authority for
compelling audits in those communities.
103. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 5; ACIR, REPORT NO. M-95, STATE
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.103 at 21 (Nov. 1975).
104. See notes 40-49, 62-63, 99 and accompanying text supra.
105. New Jersey has two supervisory agencies: the Division of Local Finance of the
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs and the Local Government Board.
106. Ehret, Broad Authority Can't Rule Out Cooperation, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 26.
107. As used in this comment, "long-term debt" describes loans that do not mature in the
current fiscal year. The term "short-term debt" means debt that will mature in a year or less
and is paid out of current revenues.
108. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102 (Nov. 1975).
109. ACIR, REPORT No. A-10, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT I (Sept. 1961).
110. Comment, Municipal Debi Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 612,613
(1970).
tax base."' Pennsylvania adopted such a provision in 1874, limiting
long-term debt to two percent of the assessed value of taxable real property.
This amount could be increased by referendum, but the maximum, even
with voter authorization, was seven percent.' 12 At present most constitu-
tional and statutory provisions restricting debt continue to use assessed
value as the base factor in determining debt limits.
13
Though intended to force responsibility upon local government off i-
cers, debt restrictions of this type suffer from numerous deficiencies. First,
restrictions based on property tax assessment look to present or past
conditions rather than to the future when the debt will be paid off.
11 4
Second, this type of legislation measures only one revenue source, the
property tax, which now provides less than half of the revenues in most
local government units.' 1 5 Third, this type of limit does not take into
account such factors as overlapping of property tax provisions by different
layers of local government and the effect of differences in local assessment
practices. 116 Last, the inflexibility of assessment limitations has led to the
creation of numerous devices for evading them." 7
The Pennsylvania constitutional revision of 1967 made a radical
change in the way the Commonwealth approaches municipal long-term
debt limitations. Article IX, section 10 now provides that the "debt limit
base shall be a percentage of the total revenue. . . of the local government
unit . . . . 118 Furthermore, this section provides that the percentage
limit is to be defined by the legislature and computed over a specific period
immediately preceding the year of borrowing. 19 In a third major change
the constitution specifies that the debt limit shall exclude all debt that has
Ill. ACIR, REPORT No. A- 10, STATE CONSTITUTIONALAND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 2 (Sept. 1961).
112. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1874), provides:
The debt of any county, city, borough, township, school district or other municipal-
ity or incorporated district. . . shall never exceed. . . two per centum upon such
assessed valuation of property, without the asset of the electors thereof at a public
election . ..
If approved by the electors, debt could be increased, but the total, approved and unapproved
could not exceed seven percent. Id.
113. 6 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 41.08 (1970). Both New York and
New Jersey have this type of debt restriction.
114. ACIR, REPORT No. M-26, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGE-




118. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10 provides:
Subject only to the restrictions imposed by this section, the General Assembly shall
prescribe the debt limits of all units of local government including municipalities
and school districts. For such purposes, the debt limit base shall be a percentage of
the total revenue, as defined by the General Assembly, of the unit of local
government computed over a specific period immediately preceding the year of
borrowing. The debt limit to be prescribed in every such case shall exclude all
indebtedness (1) for any project to the extent that it is self-liquidating or self-
supporting or which has heretofore been defined as self-liquidating or self-
supporting, or (2) which has been approved by referendum held in such manner as
shall be provided by law. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the City
or County of Philadelphia.
119. Id.
been approved by referendum.' 20 These new provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution are a significant improvement over the assessed value
method of debt limitation. Limits based upon revenue are more realistic
because they accurately reflect the municipality's ability to repay.121
Granting the General Assembly the power to set the percentage limitation
gives the state more control over long-term debt limits and eases the task of
changing the law to meet new economic conditions. 122 Formerly, all
changes required a constitutional amendment. The exclusion of voter-
approved borrowings from the debt restrictions adds needed flexibility to
the power of municipalities to incur debt and should promote the issuance
of guaranteed bonds. 1
23
While these provisions are a marked improvement, the form of
long-term debt restriction in Pennsylvania suffers from two problems.
First, debt control can still be avoided by the use of municipal authorities to
finance projects.' 24 Large amounts of debt are now funneled through such
authorities.125 Should this be coupled with a large amount of unrestricted
electoral debt, a municipality could find itself in a difficult financial
position despite the preventative provisions of the constitution. Local
voters, however, have shown an ample amount of discretion in approving
unrestricted debt.
126
Second, the Pennsylvania Constitution contains a separate debt limi-
tation provision that applies only to the city of Philadelphia. Article IX,
section 12 restricts Philadelphia's debt to three percent of annual assessed
valuation, unless the electors approve an increase.' 27 The maximum limit
is thirteen and one-half percent of total assessed valuation.' 28 This section
contains no substantial change from the debt limitation base of 1874.129
The rationale behind the retention of this provision was that the city's credit
120. Id.
121. Comment, Municipal Debt Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 612,640
(1970).
122. Id. at 641.
123. ACIR, REPORT No. A-10, STATE CONSTITUTIONALAND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 4 (Sept. 1961).
124. Municipal authorities, created under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 301-74 (1966), are
often used to circumvent debt restrictions.
125. In 1973, there were seventy municipal authorities in Pennsylvania, funding 2,450
projects and incurring $282.5 million of debt. Borrowing by municipal authorities reached its
peak in 1971 when nearly $824 million of debt was incurred. As of December 31, 1973, the total
outstanding debt of all municipal authorities in Pennsylvania was $4.3 billion. PA. BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, RESEARCH AND PLANNING, PENNSYLVANIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 244-45 (1975).
126. Comment, Municipal Debt Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 612,640
(1970).
127. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 12 provides:
The debt of the City of Philadelphia may be increased in such amount that the total
debt of said city shall not exceed thirteen and one-half percent of the average of the
annual assessed valuations of the taxable realty therein, during the ten years
immediately preceding the year in which such increase is made, but said city shall
not increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding three percent upon such
average assessed valuation of realty, without the consent of the electors thereof at a
public election held in such manner as shall be provided by law.
128. Id.
129. The debt limitation base was 2% in 1874. Elector approval could increase this base
to 10%. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1874).
rating would be adversely affected by a change. 130 This reasoning does not
adequately explain the distinction, since credit ratings are based on ability
to repay rather than the ability to incur debts.' 31 This provision suffers,
moreover, from all the infirmities of property assessment-based debt
limits. 132
While Pennsylvania is to be commended for its effort to put municipal
debt limitations on a realistic basis, some major changes should be made.
The state should place some restrictions on borrowing by municipal
authorities. Article IX, section 12 of the Pennsylvania Constitution should
be repealed, and Philadelphia should be subjected to the revenue-based
debt limitations of article IX, section 10.
2. Limitations on Maturity Date. -The purpose of limitations on
the maturity date of a bond issue is to prevent a municipality from incurring
debt for which it will have to make payments long after the useful life of the
financed project. The Pennsylvania Local Government Unit Debt Act'
33
limits the maturity date on all municipal obligations to forty years or the
estimated useful life of the project, whichever is less. 34 Estimates are to be
''realistic" but the statute does not define the term, nor does it say who is to
determine what is "realistic" in any given set of circumstances.
35
Pennsylvania should adopt a provision that sets up a table of limits within
which the useful life is to be estimated. 136
3. Reporting of Indebtedness.-Local units can strengthen their
credit standing by providing extensive financial data to investors. The state
government should therefore establish standards for reporting of indebted-
ness. Under Pennsylvania law, each local government must file with DCA
a "debt statement" before it is permitted to deliver bonds or notes. 137 This
130. PA. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1967-1968, Public Hearings Before the Comm.
on Local Government, Dec. 28, 1967, at 222 (testimony of David Rondall, representing the
City Solicitor's Office of Philadelphia).
131. Comment, Municipal Debt Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 612
(1970).
132. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra. It has been suggested that the
disparity between the two sections is violative of equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Consitution. For an in-depth discussion, see Comment,
Municipal Debt Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 612, 647-52 (1970).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6780-1 to 6780-605 (Supp. 1976).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-252 (Supp. 1976).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:2-22 (1976).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-160 (Supp. 1976) provides:
(a) Before delivering any bonds or notes, or executing a lease evidencing the
acquisition of a capital asset, the officer or officers authorized by ordinance of the
local government unit shall prepare and verify under oath or affirmation a debt
statement as of a date not more than sixty days before the filing with the department
showing:
(1) The gross indebtedness of the local government unit;
(2) By items, the claimed credits and exclusions from gross indebtedness
permitted by this act in determining net debt;
(3) The remaining electoral debt, net non-electoral debt and net lease rental
debt of the local government unit totaled separately . . . ;
(4) The aggregate principal amount of the bonds or notes being issued orto be
supported by a lease;
(5) The amount thereof constituting new net non-electoral debt or new net
lease rental debt;
statement provides various types of financial data including the amount of
the municipality's outstanding debt in the various categories defined in the
Act. 138 DCA is directed to review these statements to determine whether
the statute has been complied with. 39 Once filed, the statements are public
records.' 40 Reporting provisions in other states are similar.
The existing debt reporting provisions in Pennsylvania would be
adequate if investors had access to independent annual audits. Excessive
data tends to obscure important facts. The glut of information now
available on the financial markets sometimes overwhelms the experts as
well as the average investor. Pennsylvania should therefore retain its
current debt reporting provisions.' 4 '
B. Short-Term Debt
Misuse of short-term borrowing is the single most important cause of
fiscal problems in local government. 42 A municipality that is short on cash
must resort to some kind of borrowing to meet operating expenses. In some
municipalities, fund surplus is sufficient to cover a temporary deficiency.
Other units borrow money from restricted funds such as pension programs
to meet a temporary cash need. Many cities resort to short-term operating
loans to cover cash deficits. 14 3 The danger in using short-term debt is that
after the municipality has borrowed, it often realizes that revenues will not
reach anticipated levels. In lieu of cutting services, municipalities find it
easier to carry the loan over into the next fiscal year.' This practice
ignores the cash deficit that is actually represented by the loan. Accumula-
tions over several years could reach unmanageable proportions. At this
point refinancing becomes difficult and expensive. 45 Financial stability
can also be threatened if a loan falls due in an adverse or chaotic market. 
46
Such conditions could make refinancing impossible, immediately raising
the spectre of default. 147 Even if default is avoided, the loss of confidence
(6) The aggregate net non-electoral debt and the net non-electoral debt and net
lease rental debt combined, stated separately, to be outstanding after settlement for
the issue;
(7) The borrowing base of the local government unit ...
(8) The applicable non-electoral debt limit and the limit for non-electoral plus
lease rental debt ....
138. Id.
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-354 (Supp. 1976).
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-357 (Supp. 1976).
141. Michigan takes a different approach to the problem of controlling municipal debt. In
Michigan all municipal obligations must be approved by the Municipal Finance Commission.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3188 (1969). There is an interest ceiling of eight percent. Id. §
5.3188(45a). No obligations can be approved unless the municipality has voted an increase in
taxes sufficient to pay the principal. Id. § 5.3188(14). The Commission has broad investigative
powers. Id. § 5.3188(4).
142. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 5.
143. Id. at 61-62.
144. The term "carry over" (sometimes called "rollover") means that another loan is
obtained to pay for the original, or that the short-term loan is refinanced so that it matures at
the end of the succeeding fiscal year.
145. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 62.
146. Id.
147. Not all short-term loans lead to these problems. When properly managed, short-
term debt is a useful device for providing a municipality with cash while it waits for taxes to
fall due.
in the financial ability of the municipality could still have a devastating
effect. 148 These facts must be emphasized in the face of a sharp increase in
the use of short-term operating debt by municipalities. 4 9 The evils of
mismanagement of short-term debt have been largely ignored, however.
Few state governments adequately monitor and control the use of short-
term debt by municipalities.'
50
1. Pennsylvania Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. -Short-
term operating debt is excluded from debt limitations under both article IX,
section 10 and the Local Government Unit Debt Act. 51 In American La
France Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of Shenandoah,152 a United States
District Court held that when temporary borrowing by a municipality does
not overreach current revenues and does not extend beyond present means
of payment possessed by a municipality, there is no "debt," even though
the loans are not actually paid out of current revenues and some portion of
them is carried over into succeeding years. '53 This case indicates that in the
constitutional sense, the term debt does not include borrowings that have
been provided for in the current budget whether or not those borrowings are
actually repaid during the current fiscal year. The definition therefore
focuses upon the purpose for which the loan was taken rather than the
method by which it is actually repaid.154
The Pennsylvania Local Government Unit Debt Act155 is the statutory
implementation of the Pennsylvania constitutional debt limits. The defini-
tion of debt under this Act excludes "current obligations for the full
payment of which current revenues have been appropriated, including tax
anticipation notes" and "current payments for the funding of pension
plans." 1 56 This provision apparently reflects the definition of debt de-
veloped in the courts. There is no reference to the effect of carrying
temporary debt over into succeeding years. The controlling factor is
whether repayment of the debt has been provided for out of current
revenues, and not whether the debt was actually paid from those revenues.
The exclusion of short-term debt from constitutionally imposed debt limits
is significant in two ways. First, short-term debt is not approved by the
voters. Second, if outstanding short-term debt were added to total long-term
indebtedness, many municipalities would exceed their debt limits.' 
57
148. Renshaw, Outlining a Role for the States, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 15.
149. ACIR, REPORT No. A-12, supra note 19, at 63 (see table 4-2). In 1972, Philadelphia
had over $100 million in outstanding short-term debt. PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF STATICTICS,
RESEARCH, AND PLANNING, PENNSYLVANIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 237 (1975).
150. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 63.
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6780-1 to 6780-605 (Supp. 1976).
152. 30 F. Supp. 251 (D.C. 1939) (applying Pennsylvania constitutional law).
153. Id. at 253.
154. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvaniain McAnulty v.
City of Pittsburgh, 284 Pa. 304, 131 A. 263 (1925). In McAnulty, an obligation to pay in the
future for present improvements was held to be debt, but if repayment was provided out of
subsequent current revenues, there was no debt in the constitutional sense. Id. at 309, 131 A.
at 265; accord, Graham v. Philadelphia, 234 Pa. 513, 6 A.2d 78 (1939).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6780-1 to 6780-605 (Supp. 1976).
156. Id. § 6780-2.
157. At the end of 1972, Philadelphia had a borrowing capacity of $91.5 million before the
The Pennsylvania Local Government Unit Debt Act does contain
some provisions pertaining to short-term debt. Both bond anticipation and
tax anticipation notes are authorized.1 58 Tax anticipation notes are limited
to eighty-five percent of the sum of all taxes levied in the current fiscal
year 159 and are secured by a first lien on revenues received by the local
government unit. 160 Tax anticipation notes must mature by the end of the
fiscal year. 161 Unfunded short-term debt is permitted, with the approval of
DCA, if the municipality can show that the obligation is for current
expenses which cannot be paid without a dangerous curtailment of munici-
pal services, and that an additional tax levy would not be legal or would be
so seriously regressive that it would not be in the public interest.'
62
Unfunded debt may be approved by the commonwealth court on a similar
showing.
163
The Pennsylvania statute provides a measure of control over tempo-
rary operating debt, but some deficiencies persist. Although the statute
mandates that temporary debt must mature by the end of the fiscal year, this
provision applies only to funded debt. Unfunded debt, which in reality is
evidence of a cash deficit, can be carried beyond the end of the fiscal year.
The approval mechanism ironically depends not on the financial condition
of the municipality, but upon a showing that the municipality cannot pay
for current expenses and cannot raise taxes to pay for those expenses. Once
these conditons are shown, approval is automatic.
164
Another problem is Philadelphia's exclusion from the provisions of
the Act. Under the constitutional definition of debt, short-term debt is not
subject to debt limits. Philadelphia can, therefore, significantly exceed its
debt limits by incurring short-term debt and carrying this debt over into
succeeding years. In 1974 Philadelphia's total outstanding short- and
long-term debt exceeded the city's debt limit. 1
65
2. Comparison with Other States. -New Jersey's Local Budget
Law contains several provisions for control of short-term debt that
complement the more limited scope of Pennsylvania's provisions. New
Jersey requires that tax anticipation notes be issued only for items stated in
the budget. 166 Since the budget must by law be balanced, short-term debt in
debt limit was reached. At the same time, the city had nearly $101 million in outstanding
short-term debt. PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF STATISTICS, RESEARCH AND PLANNING, PENNSYL-
VANIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 236-37 (1975).
158. Anticipation notes are short-term loans taken to provide cash, until bonds are issued
or tax revenus are received. Bond anticipation notes are authorized at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
6780-158 (Supp. 1976). Tax anticipation notes are provided for in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
6780-201 (Supp. 1976).
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6780-202 (Supp. 1976). Bond anticipation notes are taken in
the amount of the anticipated bond issue.
160. Id. § 6780-204.
161. Id. § 6780-203.
162. Id. § 6780-209.
163. Id. § 6780-212
164. Id. § 6780-211.
165. See note 162 supra.
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-65 (1976).
New Jersey cannot be used to fund cash deficiencies.' 67 Limits on the value
of the notes to be issued are based on actual revenue received in the
preceding year and not on estimates as in Pennsylvania.' 68 The rate of
interest on such notes is limited to six percent. 1
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Michigan maintains strict state control over municipal short-term
borrowing. The Municipal Finance Commission must approve all borrow-
ing. 170 Short-term debt is limited to fifty percent of the current budget, and
when cash is borrowed to pay for operating expenses, it may be used for
only those expenses that could not have been reasonably foreseen or
adequately provided for in the tax levy.'71 When the commission deter-
mines that a borrowing will result in a deficit of necessary operating
expenses, it will require the municipality to levy additional taxes to prevent
continuation of the deficit. 172 Kansas and Nevada are the only other states
that have statutes requiring state approval for short-term debt. 7 3 New
Mexico does not allow short-term operating debt. 1
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3. Comments and Recommendations.--The use of short-term debt
to fund cash deficiencies in current operating expenses is a financially
dangerous proposition and must be managed with proper care. 75 Pennsyl-
vania should enact, as a minimum, the requirement that any short-term
debt remaining unliquidated at the end of the fiscal year be charged against
debt limits. Provisions for its retirement should be automatically included
in the succeeding year's budget.' 76 Furthermore, Pennsylvania should
include all local government units in such provisions and require that
competent data be collected to promote responsible use of short-term debt.
V. State Intervention when Local Fiscal Emergencies Occur
When a municipality suffers a financial crisis, intervention by the
167. Id. § 40A:4-2, 3.
168. Id. § 40A:4-66 provides:
The amount of tax anticipation notes of any fiscal year outstanding at any I
time shall not exceed an amount certified as the gross borrowing power, and no
such notes shall be authorized in excess of an amount certified as the net borrowing
power, each computed and certified as follows:
a. The gross borrowing power in respect to tax anticipation notes of such
fiscal year, being 30% of the tax levy of the next preceding fiscal year, for all
purposes in the case of a municipality and for county purposes in the case of a
county, plus 30% of the amount of miscellaneous revenues realized in cash during
the next preceding fiscal year, is $ ......
b. The amount of notes outstanding in anticipation of the collection of taxes of
such fiscal year, except such notes as will be renewed by or paid from the proceeds
of the notes to be issued, is $ ......
c. The net borrowing power, being the excess of the first over the second of
the 2 above amounts, is $ ......
Such certificate shall be made by the financial officer who is designated to sign
such notes, filed in the office of the clerk, and quoted in full in the resolution
authorizing such notes.
169. Id. § 40A:4-68.
170. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3188(13) (1969).
171. Id. § 5.3188(14).
172. Id.
173. See KAN. STAT. § 79-2935 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 354.430 (1971).
174. N. MEX. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
175. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 5.
176. Id.
state can be justified on three grounds. First, all local governments are
subdivisions of the state, deriving their authority from the constitution and
statutes of the state. '7 7 Second, states have a constitutional duty to protect
the general welfare of their citizens. 178 Third, a financial emergency in one
local government can cause serious damage to the ability of other govern-
mental units in the state to obtain credit.179 Most states, however, do not
provide assistance to municipalities faced with financial disaster. Conse-
quently, when a crisis occurs, valuable time is wasted debating the proper
course of state action. States should adopt legislative programs designed to
counter quickly and efficiently the effects of local fiscal emergencies. Any
such program must have two parts: a definition of "financial emergency,"
and guidelines for remedial action.
A. Definition of Local Fiscal Emergency
A recent study by Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions [hereinafter ACIR] on the historical causes of municipal bankruptcy
cites the existence of one or more of the following conditions as a warning
of an impending financial crisis:
1 80
(1) a substantial deficit in one fiscal period;
(2) a consistent revenue-expenditure imbalance in small amounts
over a period of several years;
(3) an excess of operating liabilities over current-assets;
(4) the existence of outstanding short-term loans at the end of the
fiscal year;'
8 1
(5) a poor property tax collection record; and
(6) a sudden decrease in assessed values of real property.
Relying on these findings, ACIR has proposed model legislation that
would authorize the state to intervene in a financial crisis when
(a) The unit of local government fails. . . to pay loans from
banks or principal or interest due on notes or bonded debt in full
within 28 days of the due date.
(b) The unit . . . for a period of 28 days or more fails to
transfer to the appropriate agency:
(1) taxes withheld on the income of employees; or
(2) employer and employee contributions for:
(i) federal social security; or
(ii) any pension, retirement or benefit plan of any
employee.
177. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102 (Nov. 1975); see
note 23 and accompanying text supra.
178. See note 23 supra.
179. Id.
180. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at4. Prior to New York City's current fiscal
crisis, city finances showed the existence of four of the ACIR warning signals. N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1975, at 31, col. 2.
181. This would include borrowings from restricted funds or increasing accounts
payable.
(c) The unit . . . fails for a period of 28 days to pay:
(1) wages and salaries owed to employees; or
(2) pension and retirement benefits owed to former
employees.
(d) The total amount of all forms of non-bonded debt...
due and payableat the end of the fiscal year, less reserves .. is
in excess of 10 percent of the total expenditures of the unit in the
fiscal year.
(e) The unit of local government fails [adequately] to fund
any pension program .... 182
New Jersey is the only state with a comprehensive act dealing with
municipalities on unsound financial footing. 18 3 This act provides remedial
steps to be taken when a local government unit has defaulted on payments
of principal or interest on bonds, has unpaid accounts with other govern-
mental units for two successive years, has a cash deficit exceeding five
percent of taxes levied for two successive years, has collected less than
fifty percent of all property taxes due for two successive years, or has
increased its debt appropriation to more than twenty-five percent of total
operating costs.' 
8 4
While adequate, the ACIR and New Jersey provisions do not cover all
possible indicators of financial problems. Under the ACIR plan, state
action would not be triggered by a budget deficit or an unforeseen decrease
in tax revenues. In New Jersey, tax revenue must fail to reach fifty percent
of the levy before the state can act. '8 5 Neither plan includes the exhaustion
of revenue sources as a trigger to intervention.'
8 6
B. Remedial Powers
When a financial emergency is shown to exist, the state must act
quickly to prevent the situation from deteriorating. A state agency should
exist with the power to intervene when a financial problem becomes
182. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102 (Nov. 1975).
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-54 to 27BB-95 (1955).
184. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-55 (1955) provides:
The provisions of this article shall take effect in a municipality when, at the end
of a fiscal year, any of the following conditions exist:
(1) A default exists in the payment of principal or interest upon bonded
obligations or bond anticipation obligations, for which no funds or insufficient
funds are on hand and segregated in a special trust fund.
(2) Payments due and owing the State, county, school district or special
district, .or any of them, are unpaid for other than the year just closed and the year
next preceding that year.
(3) An appropriation for "cash deficit of preceding year" in an amount in
excess of five per centum (5%) of the total amount of taxes levied upon real and
personal property for all purposes in such preceding year, is required to be included
in the next regular budget and was required to be included in the budget for the year
just closed; ....
(4) Less than fifty per centum (50%) of the total amount of taxes levied for all
purposes upon real and personal property in the taxing district, in the year just
closed and in the year next preceding that year, respectively, were collected during
the year of levy. ...
(5) The appropriation required to be included in the next regular budget for the
liquidation of floating debt . . . exceeds twenty-five per centum (25%) of the total
or appropriations for operating purposes. ...
185. A 25% tax delinquency is considered poor.
186. See Beatty, Some Basic Indicators of Distress, DCA REP., Jan. 1973, at 31.
unmanageable for a municipality. ACIR recommends that this agency have
six types of remedial power.' 87 First, the agency should have broad
investigative power including complete access to all books and records. 1
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Second, all appropriations, contracts, expenditures, loans or other actions
resulting in claims against the municipality should be subject to agency
approval.' 8 9 Third, the agency should assume the duty of providing
administrative assistance, and should appoint a local finance administrator
to oversee financial rehabilitation. 190 Fourth, the agency should act as the
agent of the municipality in collective bargaining with employees. 19! Fifth,
the agency should compile a revised budget and a plan for liquidating
current debt. 192 Last, the agency should be able to provide cash loans or
loan guarantees to meet the needs of the municipality.'
93
New Jersey has created an agency with similar powers. On several
occasions this agency has been successful in preventing the bankruptcy of
financially troubled municipalities. In one instance, a New Jersey city
showed a budget deficit equal to thirty-eight percent of total revenues.' 94
Massive state assistance, including authorization for new taxes and some
monetary subsidies, prevented a default. 95 The state was able to act
quickly because the quality of records required by statute gave adequate
warning of the crisis and because a state agency had the statutory power to
intervene.
C. Comments and Recommendations
An agency with broad powers of intervention is constitutionally
prohibited in Pennsylvania. Article III, section 31 bars the General
Assembly from delegating to a "special commission" any power to
supervise substantive municipal functions.' 96 Thus, the power to approve
or disapprove contracts or other claims against a municipality and the
power to appoint an administrative control officer would not be available to
any agency in Pennsylvania. 197 Furthermore, article VIII, section 9 pro-
187. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102 (Nov. 1975).
188. Id. § 4.102(4)(e). New Jersey currently has statutory provisions that parallel the
ACIR proposal. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.27BB-61, 27BB-62, 27BB-67 (1955).
189. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102(4)(b), (f) (Nov.
1975); compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-57, 8 (1955).
190. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102(4)(i) (Nov. 1975);
New Jersey has a comparable statutory provision. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-63 (1955).
In New Jersey a local Administrator of Finance is appointed when the Local Government
Board determines that the municipality in question needs special remedial treatment. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-71 (1955). Special remedial treatment goes into effect when the
municipality has a cash deficit of 10% or more in I of the previous three years. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27BB-69 (1955).
191. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, §4.102(4)(h) (Nov. 1975).
192. Id. § 4.102(4)(b), (c). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-58, 27BB-61 (1955).
193. ACIR, REPORT No. M-95, STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM § 4.102(4)(L) (Nov. 1975).
194. In 1971, the city of Newark faced a deficit of $61 million on a total budget of $161
million. The city ended the year with $11 million surplus and no outstanding short-term
operating loans. ACIR, REPORT No. A-42, supra note 2, at 45.
195. Id.
196. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text supra.
197. Id. Such power could be assumed by the General Assembly, but this type of control
would be neither quick nor preplanned.
hibits the Commonwealth from assuming the debt of any local governmen-
tal unit. 98 Although this section has not been interpreted by the courts, it
would on its face prohibit loans or loan guarantees by the state for the
purpose of alleviating local debt problems. Both of these sections consti-
tute unnecessary hinderances to Pennsylvania's ability to correct financial
problems in its municipal subdivisions. Pennsylvania should, therefore,
repeal these sections and pass legislation creating state powers to deal with
local financial crises.
VI. Conclusion
Because municipalities are responsive to personal needs, they are an
essential part of the nation's governmental structure. Rising costs and
increasing demands are a threat to the continued delivery of adequate local
services. External revenue sources, such as federal revenue sharing,
provide temporary help, but these are not the solution. Inefficiency and
waste in local government must be eliminated. To accomplish this, the
states must mandate the use of modern administrative techniques and assist
in the implementation of these techniques. Pennsylvania has failed to
develop such legislation. Consequently, the state is powerless to relieve the
severe economic crises that exist in many local units.
JAMES R. RONCA
198. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 provides:
The Commonwealth shall not assume the debt, or any part thereof, of any county,
city, borough, incorporated town, township or any similar general purpose unit of
government unless such debt shall have been incurred to enable the Common-
wealth to suppress insurrection or to assist the Commonwealth in the discharge of
any portion of its present indebtedness.
